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There is something common among international trials that have involved the use of 
command responsibility, in that the boundaries of fault in some cases were not at all clear. 
Here, I distinguish between material fault and liability. Material Fault is impossible in the 
absence of a pre-existing criminal conduct, which in turn gives rise to liability. This liability 
may further be distinguished twofold: firstly, in terms of satisfying the mental and factual 
elements of the offence in question (which may be termed legal fault), and; secondly, in 
terms of categorising the perpetrator’s overall participation in the crime (ie as principal, 
accessory, co-perpetrator or other). Thus, it follows that fault is circumscribed and dependent 
on the particular forms of liability pertinent to each offence. By way of illustration, liability 
for unlawful homicide lies with the direct perpetrator, as well as possible accessories. Quite 
clearly, fault and liability are ascribed to the same actors. This pattern is pretty much 
consistent in domestic criminal laws, no doubt because domestic crimes in their majority do 
not involve complex organisations and multiple victims. In international law, the 
aforementioned fault-liability paradigm has been severed not only because of the obvious 
complexity underlying international crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity, 
but more importantly because it is recognised that the concept of legal and material fault is 
incapable of fully encompassing the complexities of justice lato sensu. The liability 
associated with the responsibility of persons in authority and effective control over others 
seems at first glance to satisfy the dictates of justice. However, as the authors writing on 
command responsibility in this volume have rightly identified, as well as those writing before 
them, when one departs from the fault-liability paradigm, one has to justify this expansion of 
fault. If this is not done convincingly it will lack legitimacy and will therefore undo the very 
justice it was originally set up to serve.1 
What is also a common thread behind international criminal trials since the ICTY, and 
which has a direct bearing on command responsibility, is the fact that the donors, through the 
collective facade of “international community”, expect convictions rather than justice more 
generally. This is exemplified by numerous accounts, but I will simply state a few. Of 
particular importance are: a) the constructions of complex liabilities, such as joint criminal 
enterprise (JCE) and command responsibility in the absence of other liabilities that facilitate 
conviction; b) the attraction of donors through the semantics of convictions and the 
subsequent success of the various prosecutors on this basis, as well as; c) the absence of any 
meaningful dialogue with the victimised communities in order to assess their needs and 
desires with respect to transitional justice and development.  
Ethnographic studies on the SCSL’s outreach program in the heartlands of Sierra 
Leone, for example, demonstrate that the people were simply informed of the international 
community’s decision and effort to establish the Special Court, but were not meaningfully 
consulted on any alternatives or asked to express their own desires and aspirations. 
Ultimately, it seems that the majority of the local population were not simply highly 
suspicious of the Special Court but more importantly their primary concerns centred around 
the fulfilment of fundamental human needs and development rather than meting out 
 
1 This lack of legitimacy has been a constant criticism of JCE. See ME Badar, Just Convict Everyone! Joint 
Perpetration: From Tadic to Stakic and Back Again (2006) 6 International Criminal Law Review 293. 
expensive justice to a handful of individuals.2 Hence, it is not clear whether the formulation 
of complex liabilities beyond the fault-liability paradigm is the product of donor expectations 
for convictions or the direct result of justice gaps identified by the judges of international 
tribunals that are freed from the procedural and constitutional limitations inherent in domestic 
systems. The truth must necessarily lie somewhere in the middle. 
The current status of command responsibility under international law is well settled, 
at least in most respects.3 It would probably be more accurate to say that there is widespread 
agreement as regards its boundaries, because there is still fierce debate as to how we should 
approach knowledge and effective control, among others. What I propose to do in the 
remainder of this comment is to assess the evolution and difficulties in applying the doctrine, 
as elaborated thus far in scholarly opinion and the jurisprudence of courts and tribunals, from 
the point of view of the anthropological realities of Africa and Sierra Leone. 
 
 
Anthropology as a Tool for Assessing Complex Liabilities 
 
Anthropology and law seem at first glance to have nothing in common. The first seeks to 
elucidate collective human behaviour and understand its cultural underpinnings whereas the 
second is concerned with rules and order. It is evident that since rules and order are not 
produced in a void but rather with a view to regulating human relations, it follows that law is 
a necessary component of culture in the same manner as work, leisure, art, religion and 
others.4 Law need not necessarily be formal, as is the case with legislation that is 
promulgated under strict constitutional procedures, but it may just as well be informal 
without the sanction of government. This informal law does not only exist in past and present 
rural societies in the heartlands of Africa and Asia, but also in the very midst of industrialised 
western societies. The so-called lex mercatoria and the pursuit of self-regulation by particular 
industries, as is indeed the very concept of contract and party autonomy thereto,5 is evidence 
of man’s desire to regulate in certain cases human interaction by means of informal, but no 
less binding, prescriptions. Besides regulating human relations, both formal and informal law, 
particularly the latter, provides evidence of social relations, status and social interaction 
within a given community. By way of illustration, the village chief is typically the judge and 
the recognised authority in the interpretation of customary law and as such is regarded as a 
revered figure. Equally, the male warriors of the tribe, whose authority to hunt recognised as 
a customary entitlement, may enjoy first rights to the tribe’s game. Social status and the 
existence of complex roles and rules are also evident in the internal sphere of criminal gangs 
operating in industrialised settings.6 In Islamic law, too, the social from the legal is 
inseparable in countries strictly adhering to classical Shariah. For example, the inferior status 
 
2 G Anders, Juridification, Transitional Justice and Reaching out to the Public in Sierra Leone, in J Eckert, B 
Donahoe, C Strümpell, ZO Biner (eds), Law against the State: Ethnographic Forays into Law’s 
Transformations (Cambridge UP, 2012) 94, at 100, 108. 
3 See G Mettraux, The Law of Command Responsibility (Oxford UP, 2009), who paints an accurate and holistic 
picture of the boundaries and controversies surrounding the concept. 
4 For a general overview, see JM Conley, WM O’Barr, Legal Anthropology comes Home: A Brief History of 
the Ethnographic Study of Law (1993) 27 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 41. 
5 According to Teubner, the ultimate validation of lex mercatoria rests on the fact that not all legal orders are 
created by the nation State and accordingly that private orders of regulation can create law. G Teubner,Global 
Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in G Teubner (ed) Global Law without a State (Dartmouth, 
1997) 15. 
6 See JD Vigil, Urban Violence and Street Gangs (2003) 32 Annual Review of Anthropology 225; D Lamm 
Weisel, Contemporary Gangs: An Organisational Analysis (LBF Scholarly Publishing, 2002). 
ascribed to women in terms of entitlements (eg the right to be elected, weight of testimony 
etc) also determines their social status. 
 At a very basic level and in relation to our study of command responsibility, 
anthropology can assist us to ascertain those elusive de facto indicia that are necessary for 
constructing authority, power and ultimately effective control. It also allows us to understand 
whether the “subordinates” that committed the crimes were under sufficient compulsion or 
control by their superior, such that justifies the latter’s conviction despite the absence of 
direct fault. Before we go on, however, it is important to make a significant observation that 
relates to semantics. If anthropology is viewed as a method by which to draw conclusions 
pertinent to the fault-liability paradigm or complex liabilities, then this method requires an 
appropriate language in order to communicate concepts and ideas into the sphere of law.7 
Communication is crucial not only because certain words are not translatable from one 
language to another, but also because wholesale concepts and ideas themselves are alien from 
one culture to another.8 A very poignant example is necessary in order to better illustrate the 
point. In the case against Charles Taylor, a prosecution witnesses named “ZigZag” Marzah 
was quite clearly unfamiliar with the Western idiom of remorse and conscience.9 He also 
claimed that he was involved in cannibalism of enemy corpses, arguing that this was 
something expected of all warriors battling on the side of Charles Taylor.10 Whether or not 
this statement is true, it certainly stirs a wealth of emotions in the Western psyche and 
reinforces myths and stereotypes associated with primitive Africa. In fact, anthropological 
research reveals that cannibalism was historically unknown in African societies. Anders 
recalls the Human Leopards case investigated by a Special Commission Court set up by 
British colonial authorities in early twentieth century Sierra Leone. There, and without any 
corroborating forensic evidence, the court was convinced that members of a secret society 
dressing up in leopard skins went about ritual cannibalism. The basic story was described by 
insider witnesses whose communication with their colonisers must have been agonising 
through language that was fraught with significant misunderstanding and symbolism and 
which was moreover read through two very different socio-cultural perspectives. Anders 
accurately captures this as follows: 
 
In Sierra Leone and Liberia, as in many parts of Africa, social relationships and personal development are 
framed in a rich language of eating and consumption. Initiation into secret societies such as the poro is also 
expressed in an idiom of being eaten or devoured by the bush spirits in order to be reborn as a full member of 
the community. ... The political sphere, in particular, is conceptualised as a potentially dangerous terrain where 
powerful people “eat” each other in order to grow “big”. This has been famously coined by Bayart as the 
politics of the belly, who describes the consumption of the State’s resources by politicians and bureaucrats. In 
Sierra Leone, corrupt politicians are referred to as bobor bele – literally, guys with a belly eating the State’s 
resources. Therefore, the frequent cannibalism accusations in West Africa must not always be read literally. 
They should rather be interpreted in terms of a highly symbolic political language and critique of existing 
injustices [as is the case with Sierra Leone].11 
 
7 See E Mertz, Language, Law and Social Meanings: Linguistic/Anthropological Contributions to the Study of 
Law (1992) 26 Law & Society Review 413. 
8 See M Van Hoecke, Law as Communication, (Hart, 2002), in which the author’s central thesis is that all legal 
relations are to be understood in terms of dialogue, conversation and communicative processes, rather than as 
traditional command-obedience structures. Legal anthropologists such a Bohannan argued that Western legal 
terms and categories should not be employed to study the organisation and order of non-Western societies. He 
believed that such a methodology prevented a comprehensive understanding of other cultures and argued in 
favour of using native legal terms whose meaning would become evident within an ethnographic context. P 
Bohannan, Justice and Judgment among the Tiv (Oxford UP, 1957). 
9 G Anders, Testifying about Uncivilised Events: Problematic Representations of Africa in the Trial against 
Charles Taylor (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 937, at 944-45. 
10 Ibid, at 948-49. 
11 Ibid, at 956. 
 
To a Western audience it seems implausible that anyone can genuinely confuse symbolism 
from reality, or to put it bluntly, to confuse actual cannibalism from its metaphors. How can 
you say one thing and, without lying, actually mean something completely different? How is 
it that symbolism can be so easily transformed into action? This is not the time or place to 
expand fully on these issues and I am not sure I have the requisite knowledge to do so, and 
thus I will simply make reference to two case studies from the recent past. A significant part 
of the Rwandan genocide was predicated on a myth or symbolism reiterated and spread by 
the Hutu that the Tutsi were cockroaches and inferior beings. Whereas no Hutu would 
typically act on this myth unilaterally, it was the seed for future events when animosity was 
stirred through artificial means and channels and in which case an illiterate and highly 
polarised populace was unable to separate myth from reality. Anthropological research on the 
Rwandan genocide tends to show that one of the principal cultural metaphors in Rwanda, the 
“flow”, may shed some light on some of the methods for killing and torturing used by the 
Hutu. Flow in general represents something healthy, as is the case with our blood stream or 
the transformation of food into faeces and insemination into childbirth. Blockage of flow is 
associated with disease and death. The impalement of victims from the anus to the mouth as 
well as mass killings at check points, in addition to other motives, symbolises the end of 
flow.12 To a western audience it may to some degree explain certain acts of sheer cruelty 
(although certainly not fully), as well as placate genocidal patterns amounting to systematic.  
The second example is very similar, despite the fact that it took place more than fifty 
years earlier and fuelled the psyche of a much more literate and “civilised” population. I am 
referring to Nazi propaganda well prior to the commencement of World War II in 1939 
through a process of dehumanizing its enemies, such as Slavs, communists and Jews. The rest 
of the story is well known. 
 In the context of the ICTR’s investigation, legal anthropology played a significant 
part in the reconstruction of liability for genocide. It will be recalled that in its first case, that 
of Jean Paul Akayesu, the Tribunal was reluctant to apply the exact terms of Article II of the 
Genocide Convention which required that the crime could only be committed against 
members of another ethnic, national, religious or racial groups. Forensic evidence 
demonstrated that the Hutu and the Tutsi were not ethnically or racially distinct; quite the 
opposite. Their respective designations had been engineered by their Belgian colonisers and 
these had subsequently matured into distinctions of class or social status. The Tribunal 
therefore turned to legal anthropology in order to construct a more objective theory of 
victimhood for the purposes of the Genocide Convention. It held that beyond external 
characteristics such as race and ethnic origin, membership of a group may also come about by 
the personal belief of a group’s members as to their distinctiveness.13 This personal self-
distinction and self-categorisation is sanctioned only if it is validated by anthropological 
evidence; that is, if the group members have actually distinguished themselves and in 
addition other groups perceive them as being distinct. For the purposes of command 
responsibility, the conclusion is that such groups cannot, without evidence to the contrary, be 
presumed to be under the de facto control of non-group members. 
 
12 CC Taylor, The Cultural Face of Terror in the Rwandan Genocide, in AL Hinton (ed), Annihilating 
Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide (University of California Press, 2002) 137-78. 
13 ICTR Prosecutor v Akayesu, Trial Chamber Judgment (2 Sep 1998), para 702. In ICC Prosecutor v Al-Bashir, 
Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Al-Bashir (4 Mar 2009) [Al-
Bashir Warrant Decision], para 137, an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber claimed that three Sudanese tribal groups living 
in the same area, namely the Fur, the Masalit and the Zaghawa constituted distinct ethnic groups because each 
possesses its own language, tribal customs and traditional links to its lands. Without realising it, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber made an anthropological observation with legal significance. 
 
 
Elusive Effective Control 
 
One of the issues identified in the chapters dealing with command responsibility is the degree 
to which one may assume effective control in respect of jungle-based armies and militias. 
This is by no means a new theme, given that it has troubled law-makers and courts since 
command responsibility was first punctuated on the legal map with the Yamashita case.14 
There, it was controversially held that Yamashita retained effective control over Japanese 
troops that went on the rampage against civilians in Manila, even though he had split the 
Japanese forces on the Philippines in four distinct groups with all communication between 
them having been severed by their adversaries. The tribunal maintained that the atrocities 
were so widespread that Yamashita must have known about them and could have prevented 
them, despite the argument of the accused that he had given strict instructions to the Manila-
based commander to evacuate the island and return to Japan. Clearly, in the absence of any 
direct orders the tribunal could not have constructed Yamashita’s command liability had it 
not arbitrarily assumed that he enjoyed effective control of all Japanese forces on the island.  
Whatever the actual facts on the ground, a retrospective examination of effective 
control would no doubt be illumined by reference to anthropological data. Again, it is not my 
intention to go into any significant detail, but given that the case hung on whether 
Yamashita’s subordinates had in fact disobeyed his orders to evacuate and to avoid harming 
civilians, it is worth investigating Japanese military culture at the time. With the adoption of 
Shinto as the country’s official State religion in 1890 an emperor cult was established 
whereby the emperor’s divinity was based on his descent from the Goddess Amaterasu. This 
meant that the emperor’s commands, and by implication those of his representatives, were to 
be obeyed without objection. This unswerving loyalty to the emperor as the basis of the 
Japanese State (known as kokutai, which may be translated manifold, particularly 
“sovereign” or “national essence”) had earlier been institutionalised by the introduction of 
universal conscription which resulted in the indoctrination of the country’s youth and which 
continued through subsequent generations.15 This cultural dimension, coupled undoubtedly 
with fear and other elements, accounts for the acceptance of brutality within the ranks of the 
Japanese army and its members’ loyalty-to-the-death. As a result, it would have been 
characteristically untypical and out of all logic for the forces under Yamashita’s de jure 
command to disobey their commander’s direct orders. By logical implication, no distinction 
can be made between de jure and de facto command in respect of Japanese military 
organisation during World War II because even if separated from their commanders, units 
and sub-units therefore, would always religiously adhere to their superiors’ original orders – 
unless of course there were no other available orders. This observation also suggests that in 
this particular socio-military context the absence of material capacity to prevent or punish is 
irrelevant in establishing de facto or de jure command because the conduct of subordinates is 
uniform irrespective of the person under command. 
In the Rwanda conflict, de facto command and control became a central issue 
because, unlike the military-styled paramilitary groups on the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia, a significant amount of authority was exercised on the basis of traditional socio-
economic structures. Rwandan society, like most of Africa, is tribal and class-based, with 
 
14 Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 4 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 1. 
15 In fact, kokutai was introduced as a fundamental building block in Article 4 of Japan’s 1890 Constitution, also 
known as the Meiji Constitution, on account of the Tenno dynasty which assumed power through the 1868 Meiji 
restoration, remaining in power until 1945. See GM Beckmann, The Making of the Meiji Constitution: The 
Oligarchs and the Constitutional Development of Japan, 1868-1891 (University of Kansas Press, 1957). 
authority and privileges typically belonging to the elite in each tribe or clan.16 As a result, 
authority and wealth go hand-in-hand, with the elite also being the richest and better educated 
among the tribe. Until the creation of the ICTR the construction of command responsibility 
had been applied to regular armies and, at worst, to tightly-structured paramilitary units, 
which however resembled regular armies principally because they were formed and run by 
ex-military personnel, as was the case with indictments before the ICTY. The most complex 
cases had been those dealt by subsequent WW II military tribunals in respect of civilians, 
particularly industrial and political leaders.17  
The ICTR paid particular attention to these distinct anthropological features in its 
construction of hierarchies and authority in Rwandan society. In the Akayesu case the accused 
was the burgomaster of Taba commune, a position akin to that of mayor in western parlance. 
Whereas Western mayors enjoy no other authority than to enact peripheral by-laws and set 
the municipality’s economic agenda on the basis of municipal taxes and other income, in 
Rwanda the burgomaster enjoyed far greater authority. His powers were found to be much 
wider than his de jure authority.18 In fact, he was perceived as the “father” of the people, 
whose every order was to be obeyed without question or deviation.19 Clearly, informal law 
and power arrangements, whether explicit or implicit, played an important role in 
ascertaining the enjoyment of effective control over the actions of civilian populations acting 
as mobs, random groups or under a self-perceived identity. The existence of such effective 
control is further reinforced by class and education. This African case study exemplifies the 
tribunal’s desire to construct (or expand) complex liabilities on the basis of anthropological 
observations in order to reach a just conclusion; in the case at hand to establish the liability of 
an influential figure urging those under his circle of influence to commit genocide.  
 
 
The Role and origin of Influence in Sierra Leone’s Armed Groups 
 
The jurisprudence of the SLSC has revealed two broad types of military authority. The first is 
consistent with that found in regular armies and rebel forces, on the basis of a strict or not so 
strict hierarchical structure. This seems to be the case with the AFRC and the RUF. The 
second type of authority depends less on formal hierarchies and is instead entrenched in 
symbolism and mythology. This much is true with respect to the Komajors and their Civil 
Defence Forces (CDF). No doubt, elements of both types of authority are found in all groups 
in one form or another.  
 That mythology, mysticism and symbolism played a role in the military organisation 
of Sierra Leone’s factions comes as no surprise if one has followed the observations made in 
earlier sections of this chapter. This was further facilitated by the fact that although the 
country is host to twenty African groups (the largest of which are the Temne and Mende) it is 
multi-religious and the war did not start along ethnic or religious lines. Rebel groups and 
militias were thus ethnically and religiously diverse, a phenomenon already reflected in 
 
16 For an excellent anthropological account, see R Lemarchand, Power and Stratification in Rwanda: A 
Reconsideration (1996) 6 Cahiers d’ études Africaines 592. 
17 See Government Commissioner of the General Tribunal of the Military Government for the French Zone of 
Occupation in Germany v Roechling 14 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
[Trials] 1097; USA v Flick 6 Trials 1187, and; USA v von Weizsaecker [Ministries case] 14 Trials 308. Once 
again, although no direct anthropological questions were asked by these tribunals, it was deemed implicit that 
those to whom powers were delegated by the Nazi regime enjoyed sufficient control over persons committing 
particular crimes. This was a direct consequence of Nazi culture which permeated all elements of the Reich’s 
socio-economic raison d’etre. 
18 Akayesu Trial judgment, para 57. 
19 Ibid, paras 55, 74. 
membership to the country’s secret societies, particularly the poro and the bondo. 
Exceptionally, the composition of the Kamajors was Mende-based, albeit their aim was not 
necessarily to engage in inter-ethnic rivalries.20 That the Special Court made a serious effort 
to explain the mythology and mysticism underlying the organisation of the Komajors is 
evidence of the fact that socio-anthropological phenomena are of acute relevance in ascribing 
the attributes of authority in order to construct complex liabilities. It will be recalled that the 
ICTY largely rejected or, at least, ignored such factors on the assumption that factions on the 
territory of Bosnia were neatly divided along ethnic/religious lines and as a result there was 
no need to enquire in other shared traits between members of the groups. 
 I will draw on one element here that is intriguing and which although rejected by the 
ICTY should have found a place in the jurisprudence of the Special Court. I am referring to 
the power or authority to “influence” as an indication or evidence of effective control. Indeed, 
in the Čelebići case the accused Delalič was found to be a highly influential figure in the 
Bosniac army. He would possess authority to sign contracts and release orders in a POW 
camp and liaise with the highest echelons of the Bosnian Muslim authorities; yet, he did not 
possess formal authority over other subordinates, especially those in the POW camp. The 
Tribunal did not consider that this highly influential individual, in the absence of any direct 
subordinates, yielded sufficient control over those running the POW camp such that would 
have allowed him to intervene in the commission of crimes against the prisoners.21 This 
conclusion was drawn at a time when the construction of the complex liability of command 
responsibility did not warrant open-ended expansion. It was enough for the Tribunal that only 
persons exercising effective control over subordinates were subject to the doctrine. It rightly 
felt that if everyone yielding influence could also be encompassed the floodgates would be 
open to convict persons that were not at fault.22 The key word here is fault. If D, a boy-scout 
leader, has exerted and continues to exert significant influence over a group of boy scouts 
who are recruited as minors by a rebel group, it cannot be seriously claimed that he possesses 
sufficient control over all their future actions, particularly when they are spatially and 
geographically removed from him. D clearly lacks fault for failing to use his powers of 
influence to dissuade the youths. However, if D was in proximity to the minors and was an 
influential figure in the broader echelons of the group, he possesses the material capacity to 
employ his influence over the minors, even if he does not enjoy effective control by reason of 
direct subordination. In this latter scenario D is at material fault, although it will depend on 
the particular circumstances of each as to whether this fault may substantiate command 
responsibility. These particular circumstances are none other than D’s  material capacity to 
act.23 It defies logic and the dictates of justice to assert that a person with the direct capacity 
to save hundreds of lives by simply averting the would-be perpetrators bears no liability 
simply because he was not incumbent with a pre-existing duty to act. This is not merely an 
iteration or transplantation of the duty to save strangers typically associated with civil law 
jurisdictions. It goes at the very heart of material fault and all that it stands for. 
 
20 K Dupuy, HM Binningsbø, Power-Sharing and Peace-Building in Sierra Leone (CSCW Papers 2007) 3-4. 
21 ICTY Prosecutor v Delalić et al [Čelebići case], Trial Chamber judgment (16 Nov 1998), paras, 266, 653-56. 
22 This is particularly reflected in its pronouncements in ICTY Prosecutor v Brdjanin and Talić (1 Sep 2004), 
Trial Chamber Judgment, paras 276, 281; ICTY Prosecutor v Naletilić and Martinović, Trial Chamber 
Judgment (21 Mar 2003), para 68. These judgments certainly influenced the decision of the State Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in Prosecutor v Alić, Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No X-KR-06/294 (11 Apr 2008) 
at 46. 
23 This is why Mettraux, above note 3, sides with the judgments of the ICTY to reject influence as establishing 
de facto control. 
 It is not clear whether the SLSC shares this conviction given that it has not expressly 
rejected or upheld this thesis.24 It is certain that the Special Court was unaware of the 
scholarly literature suggesting that power of influence is possible even in the absence of 
authority over one’s target audience.25 Imagine if influence and authority are merged into a 
single entity. Had the Special Court been cognisant of these arguments it might have taken up 
the proposition that in situations where the power relations and social status between several 
individuals is chaotic, direct subordination is not necessary in order for the more influential 
person to establish effective control merely by his or her powers of influence.26 This chaotic 
power gap certainly existed in the context of the military factions engaged in Sierra Leone’s 
bloody wars. The spiritual leader of the Kamajors, Kondewa, is an interesting case study. The 
Kamajors were originally organised as a group of Mende hunters who responded to the 
directives of their various chiefs to protect people from the rebels.27 As a result, its members 
did not possess the military skills and discipline of a regular or rebel army. They were in need 
of organisation and guidance in order to become an organised fighting unit.28 This guidance 
came both from military as well as spiritual leaders. Kondewa was of the latter kind.  
 
He was the head of all the CDF initiators initiating the Kamajors into the Kamajor society in Sierra Leone. His 
job was to prepare herbs which the Kamajors smeared on their bodies to protect them against bullets. Kondewa 
was not a fighter, he himself never went to the war front or into active combat, but whenever a Kamajor was 
going to war, he would go to Kondewa for advice and blessing. (…) The Kamajors believed in the mystical 
powers of the initiators, especially Kondewa, and that the process of the initiation and immunisation would 
make them bullet-proof. The Kamajors looked up to Kondewa and admired the man with such powers. (…) 
Because of the mystical powers Kondewa possessed, he had command over the Kamajors from every part of the 
country.29 
 
The Special Court opined that Kondewa’s mystical powers did not automatically confer upon 
him military authority over the recruits and their operations.30 On the contrary, it was his de 
jure position of High Priest of the CDF that granted him some degree of effective control in 
certain situations and it was in respect of these that he was found to enjoy effective control.31 
 The Special Court missed a golden opportunity to defy the Čelebići myth by expressly 
stipulating that under certain circumstances the yielding of influence between asymmetric 
actors can give rise to effective control irrespective of the military, civilian or other context in 
which it is exercised. If a person can convince another that following a ritual he will be 
unaffected by his adversaries’ weapons it is absurd to claim that this person does not possess 
powers akin, if not far superior, to those enjoyed in a superior-subordinate relationship. Such 
powers of influence are no doubt rare, but in Sierra Leone where the mystical and the 
symbolic coincide with the real and the brutal the anthropological basis of the relevant 
 
24 In SLSC Prosecutor v. Brima, Kanaru and Kanu, Judgement (20 June 2007), para 788 the Special Court 
referred to a number of indicia as evidence of effective control. These may implicitly be read – although one 
could argue otherwise – as encompassing cases of significant and overpowering influence. 
25 See LA Hill, Exercising Influence without Formal Authority: How New Managers can Build Power and 
Influence (Harvard Business Press, 2008); AR Cohen, DL Bradford, Influence without Authority (Wiley, 2005). 
Hill’s motto, a pioneer on this topic, is that: “all influential managers have power but not all powerful managers 
have influence”. 
26 Influence is probably not the appropriate term here and this certainly explains why the ad hoc tribunals have 
rejected influence-based effective control out-of-hand. It should be understood as possessing the material and 
mental power to compel another to do or abstain from doing something. 
27 SLSC Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Judgment (2 Aug 2007), para 354. 
28 Even so, universal discipline remained problematic because some fighters “acted on their own without 
knowledge of central command because their area of operation was so wide”. Id, para 358. 
29 Id, paras 344-346. 
30 Ibid, para 806. 
31 Ibid, para 686. 
relationships should have been given much more prominence. Just like the results of one 
anthropological study cannot be transplanted into another – although some general 
observations may be possible – in the same manner the findings of the Special Court need not 
necessarily have to be accepted as immutable truths applicable in all future conflicts. I am not 
convinced by the argument that influence can never give rise to effective control-type 
situations. This position is sustainable of course as long as it is proven that the person in 
question had the material capacity to prevent or punish the crimes committed by those 
persons over whom he enjoyed significant influence. I can only hope that the jurisprudence 
will take anthropological evidence into consideration and finally move towards this direction. 
